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Equal Protection
The equal protection claim was based on the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and a similar provision in the state constitution. These provisions essentially ensure that every individual is accorded equal protection under the law. Courts have interpreted this to mean that government officials must provide a legitimate reason for treating similarly situated individuals differently.
In this case: The equal-protection claim arose because of the difference in treatment between billboards, which were permitted to remain until 2000, and on-premise roof signs, which were permitted to remain only until 1998. The City of Richfield provided no reasoning for this disparate treatment; and even if it had, it is unlikely the discrepancy would have survived the equal-protection challenge.
Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment, and similar state constitutional provisions, provides that a governmental entity cannot deprive an individual of property without due process in accordance with legitimate law applied even-handedly (referring back to the equal protection and treatment issue).
In this case: Michaels argued that the city was requiring removal of the sign without just compensation. The city countered that the sign had depreciated in value over time, and was essentially worthless. Therefore, the city contended, the “grace” or amortization period during which the sign was permitted to remain more than compensated for its value. To refute the city’s position, Michaels turned to expert testimony concerning the value estimate for the sign. (See "Valuation" below.)
23 U.S.C., Section 131 (Federal Highway Beautification Act)
The federal Highway Beautification Act (Act) requires just compensation for a sign if the sign to be removed is located within 660 feet of an interstate or primary highway. The Act specifically disallows amortization as a method of compensation.
In this case: Michaels’ sign clearly falls within the parameters of the Act. Consequently, under both state and federal constitutional provisions and federal congressional law, removal of the sign would trigger the city’s duty to pay just compensation for its value. In the event the Court determined that the city could require removal of the sign, but only if it paid just compensation to the property owner, expert testimony was required to establish the value. (See "Valuation" below.)
Free Speech
Today, it is essentially well settled that commercial speech is entitled to protection under the First Amendment. As applied to signs, this protection provides that a regulation must be based on reasonable time, place and manner restrictions that are content neutral. In other words, restrictions on the length of time a sign may be displayed, the place from which it may be displayed, and the manner in which it may be displayed must be reasonably related to a legitimate government interest. Further, these regulations must not differentiate between signs based on what the sign’s message says (or its content) or the identity of the messenger (a business owner viz a viz a home owner), absent a substantial state interest that cannot be advanced by other means less burdensome on speech.
In this case: The regulation was not content neutral, because it differentiated between "speakers", (e.g., off-premise billboards and on-premise roof signs) in regard to amortization periods. However, the sign so clearly fitted the definitional and compensation requirements of the Highway Beautification Act, the “free speech” aspect of the case was not raised in the original complaint, and this may have precluded its inclusion later in the lawsuit. But this is not to say that the “free speech” argument could not have been successfully presented and argued in addition or as an alternative to the other claims of constitutional and legislative violations by the city.
Valuation
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